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I
INTRODUCTION

A vast body of economic theory is concerned with the way in which parties
design contracts to align incentives and promote efficient exchange.' An
alternate view, however, ascribes to contract design a more sinister purposethat of excluding or otherwise disadvantaging rival firms. 2 Although the latter
argument has tended to target a specific set of suspect practices such as tie-in
and exclusive dealing arrangements, recent efforts have begun to associate
strategic objectives with more conventional pricing and incentive terms in

3
contracts, including such common provisions as multi-part pricing schedules
4
and stipulated damages clauses.
In the course of developing and applying the antitrust laws, the courts
have analyzed the effects of various contractual provisions on competition.
The resulting body of law recognizes that contracts have the potential to
5
exclude competitors but also that exclusion can serve efficiency purposes.
The broadening of exclusion claims to include the strategic use of common
contractual designs, and the corresponding potential to challenge a widely
used class of contractual arrangements on antitrust grounds, stand to
complicate rule-of-reason analyses of anticompetitive exclusion and raise
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1. For an overview of this literature, see Hart & Holmstrom, The Theory of Contracts, in ADVANCES
IN ECONOMIC THEORY, FIFTH WORLD CONGRESS 71 (T. Bewley ed. 1987).
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See, e.g., Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power

over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986). For a comparison of the strategic and efficiency views, see 0.
FIRMS, MARKETS,
RELATIONAL
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM:
CONTRACTING 23-29 (1985).

3. Multi-part pricing refers to the use of a schedule of prices that vary with output.
4. See, in particular, Aghion & Bolton, Contracts as a Barrier to Entry, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 388
(1987).
5. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting, 441 U.S. 1, 19-22 (1979); Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-56 (1977); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States,
246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 560-61 (1898).
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broad public policy questions about the appropriate status of contracts in
general. At a minimum, distinguishing situations in which contract provisions
have strategic purpose from those in which such terms serve a more positive
function becomes an important task.
Toward that end, this article begins by analyzing the efficiency and
strategic roles of some common contractual provisions. In particular, we
examine the assumptions underlying the results of both efficiency and
strategic models of stipulated damage clauses and attempt to identify
conditions conducive to using contracts for these conflicting purposes. Then,
to gain insight into the practical motives and processes involved in designing
contract terms and, particularly, to see whether there is evidence that these
terms played a strategic role in actual settings, we examine a number of cases
in which contracts involved stipulated damage or similar provisions affecting
the incentives of a buyer to switch to an alternative supplier.
II
STIPULATED DAMAGES

AND THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTING

The desire to design contract terms to promote efficient adaptation
without the need for costly court intervention is the theme underlying most
efficiency analyses of contracting. Given the substantial interval that often
exists between the time a contract is entered into and executed, 6 significant
changes in the environment surrounding the transaction are likely to occur,
requiring adjustments in the behavior of the parties. Because contracts that
stipulate the optimal response of each party to each conceivable contingency
are too costly to write and enforce, transactors tend to rely on a combination
of common law rules and relatively simple, easily enforced contract clauses to
accommodate change.
Among a number of common contractual arrangements that have been
interpreted in this light are two-part pricing schedules,7 stipulated damage
provisions, 8 and minimum bill contracts. 9 Each permits the quantity
transacted under the contract to be adjusted in response to market conditions
6.

Contract length varies with the nature and attributes of the transaction. Contracts extending

ten years or more in length are common in some settings. Information on contract duration for
particular industries and analyses of its determinants can be found in Joskow, Contract Duration and
Relationship Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets, 77 AM. EcON. REV. 168 (1987);
Crocker & Masten, Mitigating Contractual Hazards: Unilateral Options and Contract Length, 19 RAND J.
ECON. 327 (1988); Goldberg & Erickson, Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts: A Case
Study of Petroleum Coke, 30J. L. & ECON. 369 (1987). Also see the discussion of cases in Part IV of this
article.
7. See, e.g., Goldberg & Erickson, supra note 6.
8. See Shavell, Damage Measuresfor Breach of Contract, 11 BELLJ. ECON. 466, 470 n.14 (1980).
9. Masten, Minimum Bill Contracts: Theory and Policy, 37 J. INDUS. ECON. 85 (1988); Masten &
Crocker, Efficient Adaptation in Long-Term Contracts: Take-or-Pay Provisionsfor NaturalGas, 75 AM. ECON.
REV. 1083 (1985). More sophisticated contractual arrangements have been devised in the economic
literature on contracting. See, e.g., Harris & Townsend, Resource Allocation UnderAsymmetric Information,
49 ECONOMETRICA 33 (1981). However, we are restricting our attention here to relatively simple
pricing arrangements both to simplify the analysis and because they, unlike the more sophisticated
arrangements, are commonly observed in practice.
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and, by relating the incremental price paid by the buyer to the seller's
incremental cost, establishes incentives to respond efficiently. Moreover,
compared to more elaborate arrangements, these schemes are easy to write
and enforce, usually requiring only properly authorized orders and receipts to
verify performance.
From an efficiency perspective, the reason transactors enter into long-term
written contracts in the first place is to protect the relationship from strategic
behavior in the form of either costly haggling over quasi-rents'o or free-riding
on services or information provided by one of the transactors. The former
problem arises where one or both parties have invested in reliance, or
relationship-specific assets, in support of the transaction.' l Because such
investments have a higher value in their intended use than in their next best
use, parties have an incentive to engage in haggling or other forms of
opportunism in hopes of influencing the distribution of the resulting quasirents. Contractual guarantees reduce the incidence of such behavior by
restricting the ability of one party to extort concessions from the other by
threatening not to perform. Free-riding, on the other hand, is a potential
hazard, for example, where the cost of providing information or services
associated with a purchase is included in the price of the product. If the
unpriced service or information acquired from the original seller can be used
with a competitor's product, the purchaser will have an incentive to avoid
paying for the service by buying the product from a no-frills source.
Contracts that restrict a purchaser's ability to use competing products can
2
foster the development and provision of such services by suppliers.'
The notion that contracts are not deterrents to strategic behavior, but are
instead strategic devices themselves, stands in sharp contrast to this view.
Instead of constraining free-riding or haggling between the parties to an
exchange, contracts are perceived as a means of restricting the actions of third
parties, usually suppliers seeking to enter the market. Thus, those advocating
a strategic view contend that two-part prices and stipulated damage
provisions, instead of promoting efficient adjustment, establish entrance fees
for rival firms, with the result that some low-cost firms are foreclosed from
competing for business or deterred from entry.
In the remainder of this section, we examine how these competing
theories interpret the use of stipulated damages. For purposes of analysis,
stipulated damage provisions have the advantage of having received detailed
attention from both the strategic perspective and the efficiency perspective,
and also of being analytically tractable. The equivalence between stipulated
damages and two-part pricing schemes in many settings also permits us to
generalize our results to a broader class of contracts.
10. Quasi-rents refer to the excess of an asset's value in its current use over its next best use.
11. See, e.g., Klein, Alchian & Crawford, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive
Contracting Process, 21 J. L. & ECON. 297 (1978); Shavell, supra note 8; Williamson, Transaction-Cost
Economics: The Governance of ContractualRelations, 22 J. L. & ECON. 233, 245-54 (1979).
12. See, e.g., Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25J. L. & ECON. 1 (1982).
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Stipulated Damages and Efficient Breach

-In models of efficient breach, 13 parties to a contract face uncertainty about
some dimension of the transaction that makes it possible that actual
performance will not in fact be desirable ex post. The uncertainty may be
about the seller's costs, the buyer's valuation, or the availability of alternative
buyers or sellers. 14 The critical element is that in some situations the joint
surplus between contracting parties may be larger if they do not perform the
contract as originally intended.
Recognizing this possibility, the courts generally permit one party to
discharge an obligation by compensating the other for lost profits. To see
that the lost-profit or "expectation" measure of damages leads to efficient
breach, consider a setting in which the buyer's valuation, v, and the supplier's
cost of production, c, of a particular input are determinate, but there is
uncertainty about the cost, s(O), of acquiring supplies from an alternative
source. If the cost of the alternative supplies falls below the price, p, agreed to
in the contract (that is, s(0) < p) the buyer will wish to breach the contract
with the original seller. Efficiency, however, requires that the buyer honor the
contract with the original producer unless the cost of alternative supplies falls
below the seller's opportunity cost, or s(e) < c. Thus, for values of s(0) that
fall between the original seller's costs and the contract price (c < s(O) < p),
the buyer will wish to breach even though breach is inefficient.
If the court sets damages, 8, equal to the seller's lost profits in the event of
breach, or p-c, then the buyer would be encouraged to perform the contract
when it is efficient to do so. Specifically, the buyer would breach only if
v - s(0) - 8 > v - p or, equivalently, when s(O) < p - 8. Setting damages,
8, equal to the seller's lost profits would induce the buyer to breach when
s(O) < c (see Figure 1). As illustrated, the buyer is given the incentive to buy
from the low-cost supplier, which is, of course, efficient.
FIGURE
efficient
breach

1

efficient
performance

I'

'iI
c

' ,s (0)
p

More important for the issue at hand, the level of damages that would
maximize expected joint profits, were the parties to choose to stipulate
13. A now substantial literature in law and economics has developed on contract damages and
efficient breach. See, e.g., Barton, The Economic Basis of Damagesfor Breach of Contract, I J. LEGAL STUD.
277 (1972); Rogerson, Efficient Reliance and Damage Measuresfor Breach of Contract, 15 RAND J. ECON. 39
(1984); Shavell, supra note 8; Shavell, The Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach, 99 QJ. EcON. 121
(1984). The model to be described most closely follows Shavell, supra note 8.
14. See Shavell, supra note 8, at 474.
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damages in the contract rather than rely on the courts, is also lost profits.' 5
The reason that parties might choose to stipulate damages is to avoid the
costly process of establishing court-determined awards where the seller's
costs may be difficult for the court to assess but are reasonably stable and
recognized by the parties at the time they enter the contract.
The advantages of stipulating in advance a sum payable as damages are manifold. For
both parties, it may facilitate the calculation of risks and reduce the cost of proof. For
the injured party, it may afford the only possibility of compensation for loss that is not
susceptible of proof with sufficient certainty. For society as a whole, it may save the
time ofjudges, juries, and witnesses, as well as the parties, and may cut the expense of
litigation.'ff

Finally, notice that the difference between the amount the buyer pays if the
buyer performs the contract and the amount if the buyer breaches is
p - (p-c) = c. In other words, expectation damages make the incremental
cost of acquiring supplies from the seller equal to the seller's marginal cost.
An equivalent way of writing the contract would be to adopt a two-part pricing
schedule 17 stipulating a fixed component equal to the damage level identified
above and a per-unit price equal to the seller's marginal cost. Hence, the
generalization of the current analysis to that of two-part prices is
straightforward.
Overall, circumstances in which there is (1) uncertainty about the buyer's
alternatives and (2) relatively stable, though possibly unverifiable, costs of
production are consistent with the efficient use of stipulated damages. As
noted earlier, the desire to protect investments from free-riding or costly
opportunistic haggling motivates the adoption of explicit contractual
agreements in the first place. The duration of those agreements is likely to
reflect the longevity of the investments and, where the distribution of rents is
at issue, the degree to which the assets are specific to the relationship.' a
B.

Stipulated Damages as a Barrier to Entry

A recent article by Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton raises the
possibility that contracts containing precisely the type of incentive provisions
discussed above can be used strategically to create a barrier to entry.' 9
Indeed, the setting in which Aghion and Bolton develop their results is
remarkably similar to the one associated with the efficient use of stipulated
damages in the preceding section. 20 Specifically, the costs of the incumbent
seller, c, are determinate and known, as is the buyer's reservation price, v. But
15.

This result is demonstrated in the Appendix, infra. See also Shavell, supra note 8.

16.

E.

FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §

12.18, at 896 (1982).

17. Two-part pricing schedules combine an up-front fee and a per-unit charge. In our analysis,
the buyer would pay 8 = p-c whether or not he performed the contract and an additional per-unit
charge, c, if he bought a unit of the good from the supplier. Hence, 8 is equivalent to the fee
component and p-8 (which equals c) is equivalent to the per-unit charge.
18. See Joskow, supra note 6, at 168-73; Williamson, Franchise Biddingfor Natural Monopolies-In
General and with Respect to CATV, 7 BELLJ. ECON. 73, 79-91 (1976).
19. Aghion & Bolton, supra note 4.
20. We examine in detail only one of two models contained in their paper. The second
postulates contractual forms that, to the best of our knowledge, are not observed in practice.
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there is uncertainty about the costs, s(e), of acquiring supplies from an
alternative source. Again, the parties face a choice of contract terms including
the price and the level of damages to be stipulated in the contract.
Unlike the efficient breach models, parties in the strategic model optimally
choose a damage provision in excess of the seller's lost profits. As a result, the
buyer is induced to deal with the incumbent seller too often relative to the
optimum, thereby deterring entry by the rival for a range of costs over which
entry would be efficient. Thus, despite similarities in the underlying
environment, damage provisions, rather than promoting efficient breach,
serve as a barrier to entry.
A closer inspection of the Aghion-Bolton model reveals the source of this
disparity. As in the efficient breach model, the seller receives p-c when the
contract is performed and 8 when the buyer breaches. The buyer also nets
v-p when buying from the original supplier. But, unlike the previous model,
the buyer cannot obtain supplies from an alternative source at their cost, s(O),
and instead pays a price above this level. The ability of the "entrant" to earn
excess profits, that is, to set Pe > s(O), creates the incentive for the original
transactors to engage in strategic behavior. Since the new seller must charge
a price below p - 8 to induce the buyer to switch, stipulated damages
determine the maximum price that the entrant can charge. Assuming the new
supplier charges the highest price sufficient to induce the buyer to switch (i.e.,
Pe = p-8), the level of stipulated damages that maximizes the expected joint
profits of the original contractors satisfies
b=p-c

P
+ P"

where the probability of breach, P, is Pr[s(O) < p - 8], 2 1 and P" is the
marginal probability of P with respect to a change in p - 8.22
Thus the strategic model implies that the optimal penalty from the point of
view of the parties is one that exceeds the lost profit measure by p/p'.23 Given
a contract price, p, permitting some entry gives the seller a positive probability
(P > 0) of receiving an amount in damages, 8, greater than what the profits
would be if the buyer performed, p-c. 2 4 In designing the contract, the
21. The new seller will enter only if there exists a price, pe, above his costs, s(0), and below
8, which will be true if s(O) < p - 8. Hence, the probability of breach is Pr [s(0) < p - 8].
22. See Appendix infra.
23. Note that the equilibrium price in the strategic model will be lower than in the efficiency
model to compensate the buyer for the higher strategic penalties. The result of the strategic model is
that, given the contract price, the penalty chosen will be at a level that will induce too little breach
relative to the efficient level.
24. If the entrant's costs are uniformly distributed, damages would be set so that s-is the average
between the incumbent's costs, c, and the lowest possible value of s(6). Those familiar with the
literature on optimal auctions will recognize that the damage provision is set so that p - 8 equals the
optimal reserve price in an auction with symmetric bidders with independent private values. For an
overview of this literature, see McAfee & McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. EcON. LITERATURE 699
(1987). Despite this correspondence, we doubt that many would advocate making the use of reserve
prices in auctions or competitive bidding schemes an antitrust violation.

p -
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original transactors trade off the gains foregone when an efficient entrant is
excluded against the lower price the new supplier must accept when entry
does in fact occur. The result is that the buyer is induced to switch to the
alternative seller too infrequently relative to the social optimum (see Figure
2). Unable to supply the buyer, a rival with costs between s and c is
discouraged from entering.
FIGURE

2

entry
deterred

,

C

The role of contracts in the strategic model is to create an entry barrier
that extracts part of the potential gains from trade from rival firms. Using
damages, this extraction is accomplished by setting a penalty for breach in
excess of the efficient level; with a two-part pricing schedule, the same effect is
achieved by setting a per-unit price below the incumbent's marginal cost. The
duration of contracts, meanwhile, is limited only by the desire of the
incumbent to signal the probability of entry. An incumbent who perceives a
high probability of entry will want protection by writing a longer-term
contract, which the buyer will only agree to if the contract price is low; if the
probability of entry is low, then the seller adopts shorter-term but higher25
price agreements.
III
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE STRATEGIC USE OF DAMAGE PROVISIONS

The source of the disparity in the results of the strategic and efficiency
models of stipulated damages is readily apparent. Whereas the efficiency
model presumes that new supplies are available at their true opportunity cost,
the strategic model assumes the new supplier charges a price just sufficient to
get the buyer to switch. In the latter case, the original transactors can extract
some of the entrant's expected rents by stipulating "excessive" damage levels
that "commit" the buyer to rejecting bids above ?-. The potential inefficiency
of excluding an entrant with costs between S-and c arises because the original
transactors cannot discriminate between high-cost and low-cost entrants.
For this strategy to be successful, two factors are critical: (1) the contract
must credibly commit the parties not to deal with the entrant except on the
terms of the contract; and (2) the entrant must be able to earn positive
economic rents by serving the customer, that is, the firm must expect to be
25.

See Aghion & Bolton, supra note 4, at 396.
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able to earn a return on its assets in excess of their value in their next best
alternative use. This section evaluates these two requirements in turn.
A.

Commitment and the Law of Contracts

The importance of commitment in the strategic model can be seen by
examining the original transactors' optimal response to entry in the absence of a
binding agreement. Before an entrant made a bid, the original transactors
would have no specific information about the entrant's actual costs, leaving
the parties in the position of a non-discriminating monopolist. 2 6 Although it
would be in the interest of the parties to announce their intention to reject
bids below s, once a bid was made the parties' incentives to accept or reject
that bid would change. An entrant who met the transactor's reserve price
would reveal, by this action, that the entrant's costs were no higher than s-and
were probably lower. The original transactors could exploit this information
to appropriate a larger share of the entrant's expected rents by demanding
further price concessions. On the other hand, if no bid were made, the
original transactors would have an incentive to raise the minimum acceptable
27
price.
Thus, although a take-it-or-leave-it offer would maximize the expected
profits of the original buyer and seller, their ex post incentive to alter the
terms exposes the need for a mechanism to discourage deviations from the
original terms. If take-it-or-leave-it offers lack sufficient commitment, then
bargaining processes will determine between whom and at what price
28
exchange will take place.
The mechanism ostensibly serving to commit the parties to their best takeit-or-leave-it offer in the strategic model is contracting. Indeed, as long as the
damage provision described in the model is enforceable, the buyer will be
prevented from switching to the new supplier at bids above S. Notice,
however, that constraining the buyer's ability to accept price offers is not
enough. Since the incumbent can avoid production costs, c, by procuring
supplies from the lower-cost entrant, subcontracting produces gains
whenever s(O) < c. Thus, for the contract successfully to deter entry, it must
also limit the ability of the seller to deal with the entrant.
26. A "non-discriminating" monopolist (or, in the case of a single buyer, monopsonist) offers
the same terms to all traders. According to the strategic model, the original transactors choose
contract terms that do not take account of the entrant's actual costs. In contrast, a "discriminating"
monopolist would set terms of trade that vary with known characteristics of other parties.
27. Lack of commitment raises a technical problem with the strategic model. Anticipating that
the original seller and buyer have the incentive to take a stronger position once entry has taken place,
no supplier would enter. But this is inconsistent with the parties' expectations that the original
contract be profit-maximizing. Hence, unless the contract constrains not only concessions but also
new demands on the part of the original contractors, the model does not have an equilibrium. We
thank Naveen Khanna for bringing this point to our attention.
28. Reputation for adhering to such offers might assist an incumbent seller in its strategy, but
several factors, including the infrequency of this type of interaction, suggest that reputation would
not be a reliable source of commitment. In addition, the ability of the buyer to establish a reputation
for integrating new supply sources would provide the buyer with a dominant strategy.
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A crucial issue then becomes whether contracts in fact serve the
commitment function postulated in the strategic model. An examination of
applicable laws governing contracts suggests that they may not. First,
contracts generally permit a supplier to meet contractual obligations by
offering substitute performance. The Uniform Commercial Code, for
example, describes "both delegation of performance and assignability as
normal and permissible incidents of a contract for the sale of goods." 29 Thus,
the incumbent seller is normally at liberty to delegate performance or,
alternatively, to procure supplies from a third party. 30 In this respect, a
contract can be thought of as mainly affecting who negotiates with the lowi
cost supplier, rather than whether such negotiation can take place.3
Second, the law confers on the parties to a contract the right to modify or
rescind the terms of their agreement by mutual consent. 3 2 By splitting the
gains from dealing with the entrant three ways instead of two, the position of
both parties to the contract can be improved relative to the status quo,
satisfying a necessary condition for a modification to be negotiated and
accepted. The incentive to renegotiate once an entrant has made a bid
weakens the credibility of take-it-or-leave-it offers by the incumbents. Thus,
even a "no substitute performance" clause is likely to fall to the ex post
mutual interests of the parties.
Finally, although the common law gives the parties the latitude to stipulate
damages, it is an established rule of law that damages must be reasonable "in
light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach." 3 3 Stipulated
damages in excess of this level are regarded as penalties and are therefore
unenforceable. 3 4 If the courts restrict damages to the efficient level, supply by
the low-cost provider will occur no matter what share of the gains from trade
can be commanded for the entrant's product. Thus, in principle, the common
29. U.C.C. § 2-210 comment 1 (1978). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 318
(1979) ("Delegation of Performance of Duty").
30. The principal exceptions to this rule relate to contracts for personal services and to
contracts for the exercise of personal skill or discretion, and contracts in which delegation is
prohibited by prior agreement. Even the latter may be voided if the terms are deemed contrary to
the public interest. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 318 (1979).
31. To the extent that contracts between automobile manufacturers and dealers restrict the
ability of the dealers to carry competing manufacturers' products, American company dealings with
low-cost foreign manufacturers are modest evidence of this practice.
32. See U.C.C. § 2-209 (1978).
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1979).
34. The use of the terms "liquidated damages" and "penalties" reflects legal conclusions as to
whether stipulated damages are reasonable. See U.C.C. § 2-718 comment 1. The courts frequently
rely on the principle that allowable damages to the seller correspond to the lost profits from breach.
In David & David, Inc. v. Myerson, 277 F. Supp. 973 (1966), the court found enforceable the
requirement that a buyer take specified minimum quantities of a new product or reimburse the
patent holder for any price reductions on sales to others. Similarly, in International Electronics
Corp. v. United States, 646 F.2d 496 (Ct. Cl. 1981), the court upheld damages reasonably related to
the costs imposed on the government from a seller's breach. For more information on the courts'
treatment of liquidated damages, see generally Clarkson, Miller & Muris, Liquidated Damages v.
Penalties: Sense or Nonsense?, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 35 1; Rea, Efficiency Implications of Penalties and Liquidated
Damages, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 147 (1984); Rubin, Unenforceable Contracts: Penalty Clauses and Specific

Performance, 10 J.

LEGAL STUD.

237 (1981).
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law would not support restrictions on even the buyer's ability to deal with a
more efficient entrant.
In practice, of course, these common law impediments to strategic
contracting do not make moot the issue of anticompetitive foreclosure.
Challenging the legality of stipulated damages, like any legal action, is certain
to impose some non-recoverable enforcement costs on the plaintiff. These
costs include the obvious, such as witness time and attorney's fees, but may
also include damages to the plaintiff's reputation that make other parties less
willing to deal with the plaintiff in the future. The threat of such costs may
deter a breaching party from filing suit to reduce damages. In addition,
courts may choose to err in favor of the contract where the incumbent's costs
are particularly difficult to ascertain, as is likely to be the case where damages
were indeed stipulated for efficiency reasons. 35 Nevertheless, several factors
weigh against the survival of the penalty. First, the reality that strategic
damages exceed lost profits where the provisions were chosen strategically
favors the complainant in a trial of fact. Second, the savings to a buyer from
dealing with a low-cost supplier provide the buyer with the incentive to seek
relief from contractual penalties; the greater the inefficiency, the greater the
gains to successful litigation and the larger the incentive to sue. Finally,
litigation represents the last and probably least likely process through which
to achieve a reduction in the penalty, given the mutual gains to a negotiated
modification.
In sum, the ability to use contracts strategically may be undermined in any
of several ways. The presumed legality of delegated performance, the
illegality of penalties, and the potential for ex post agreements either to raise
or to lower the entry fee all tend to undermine the credibility of the threat not
to deal with the entrant except on the terms of the contract. In practice, the
use of contracts as a barrier to entry must be accompanied by: (1) restrictions
on the delegation of performance imposed by either the nature of the work or
an explicit provision to prevent the seller from dealing with the entrant; and
(2) high litigation and bargaining costs to prevent a legal or negotiated
adjustment to the contract. Raising the costs of switching will deter some
switching, but the resulting inefficiencies represent as much a failure in
negotiations as market foreclosure. Indeed, the economic literature on
incentive compatibility sometimes refers to the type of inefficiency generated
35. In deciding whether a stipulated damage clause is enforceable, the courts consider, in
addition to the relationship between stipulated damages and anticipated or actual losses, two other
factors: (1) the intent of the parties, and (2) the precision with which actual losses can be estimated.
The courts try to ascertain whether the parties intended payment of damages in lieu of performance
or intended that the damages would compel performance. If the court finds the latter, the damage
provision is a penalty and not enforceable. See generally E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 16. Regarding the
estimate of actual losses, the courts will not void a provision fixing liquidated damages "if the
amount liquidated bears a reasonable proportion to the probable loss and the amount of actual loss
is incapable or difficult of price estimation." Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Justice, 673 F.2d 70, 73 (1982);
Truck Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Puritan Farms 2nd, Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 420, 425, 393 N.Y.S.2d 365, 369,
361 N.E.2d 1015, 1018 (1977).
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in the present model as a "cost of information," suggesting
irremediability of the problems identified by Aghion and Bolton. 36
B.

the

Entry and Economic Rents

In addition to these commitment requirements, the ability to use contracts
strategically depends on the extent to which the damage provisions alter the
entrant's price. The less power the entrant has to set price, the less the
advantage in stipulating an excessive damage. To the extent, for example,
that the buyer wields pure bargaining power to some degree over the new
supplier, the incentive to use contracts for strategic purposes is mitigated. In
the extreme, if the new supplier is unable to charge a price above marginal
costs, the optimal damage becomes the efficient one. 3 7 The latter situation
would occur, for instance, if the uncertainty about s (0) represented
fluctuations in the price of a market substitute. In that case, competition
would keep the entrant's price at marginal cost and thereby eliminate the
38
incentive to design contracts strategically.
In the Aghion-Bolton model, there is only a single entrant who has, in
effect, full power to set price at the buyer's reservation value. This raises a
basic question about the nature of entry. Since the entrant expects positive
profits, why are other firms not attracted to the market? If the costs of entry
are the same for all firms and it makes sense for one firm to enter, then it
would also make sense for any firm. Competition for contracts to serve the
buyer would guarantee that all expected rents accrue to the buyer.
For an entrant to expect an above-normal return, differential barriers to
entry are required.3 9 In other words, the entrant must have a discrete
advantage over other potential suppliers, generating the possibility of earning
economic rents. If the source of that advantage also reveals the identity of the
firm best situated to enter the market, however, the buyer has an incentive to
integrate this supplier into the firm. By internalizing the rents accruing to
"entry," such vertical integration eliminates the complicity of the buyer. At a
minimum, the possibility of internalizing production limits the potential rents
of an independent supplier.
In general, the existence of competition to supply the buyer undermines
the possibility of using contracts strategically. In order for stipulated
damages to serve strategic purposes, it is necessary to have some form of

differential barrier to entry in addition to the commitment requirements
discussed above. Even then, bargaining power on the part of the buyer
reduces both the incentive to set excessive penalties and the amount of entry
actually deterred.
36.

See, e.g., Baron & Myerson, Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs, 50 ECONOMETRICA 911

(1982).
37.
38.
39.

See Appendix infra.
This may be thought of as the scenario implicit in the efficient breach models.
See Aghion & Bolton, supra note 4, at 390, for one explanation of why entry might be limited.
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IV
EVIDENCE OF THE STRATEGIC USE OF DAMAGES

A number of studies have examined actual contracting practices and
offered plausible efficiency rationales for observed provisions. 40 Studies
scrutinizing contracts for strategic effect, however, are relatively scarce. To
get a sense for whether the conditions necessary for strategic use of contracts
are common in practice, we examined a sample of antitrust cases in which the
design and duration of the contracts played a role. Such a sample is probably
not representative of contracting practices in general, but, rather, is biased
toward a finding of strategic effect.
Our search revealed only five reported decisions in which stipulated
damage provisions or multi-part pricing schemes were alleged to exclude
efficient rivals. 4 1 The paucity of cases may reflect a variety of factors, one of
which is the recent vintage of the literature on strategic use of these
provisions. With respect to stipulated damages, the lack of enforceability of
penalties may also be a significant factor. On the other hand, the infrequency
may indicate that the underlying conditions required for anticompetitive
exclusion to occur (the ability of entrants to earn positive profits, the reliance
on non-discriminatory commitments by incumbents, the inability to verify the
entrant's costs) are in fact uncommon.
Although the cases often involved additional concerns, in keeping with our
preceding analysis, our discussion concentrates on whether the circumstances
of each case permit a strategic interpretation of the contract provisions, or
whether efficiency considerations (either investments in relationship-specific
assets or free-rider problems) serve better to explain the use and design of the
40. See Crocker & Masten, supra note 6, at 327; Goldberg & Erickson, supra note 6; Joskow,
Vertical Integration and Long-Term Contracts: The Case of Coal-Burning Electric Generating Plants, I J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 33 (1985); Joskow, supra note 6; Masten & Crocker, supra note 9; Mulherin, Complexity
in Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis of Natural Gas Contractual Provisions, 2 J. L. EcON. & ORG. 105
(1986); Palay, ComparativeInstitutional Economics: The Governance of Rail Freight Contracting, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 265 (1984).
41. We searched all federal cases using Lexis to identify antitrust cases alleging exclusion due to
either the use of stipulated damages, return fees, penalties, or multi-part pricing. The search
revealed four disputes: United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953),
aff'dper curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); Barry Wright Corp. v. Pacific Scientific Corp., 555 F. Supp. 1264
(D. Mass. 1983), aff'd, 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983); the IBM litigation concerning plug-compatible
peripherals (Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258 (1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 510 F.2d
894 (1975); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (1978), 636 F.2d 1188
(1980); California Computer Prod. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (1979)); and Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broadcasting, 441 U.S. 1, 19-22 (1979). We discuss these cases and two others:
Automatic Radio Mfg. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950), which was cited by Aghion
and Bolton, and a recently settled dispute between Citicorp and Western Union (Citicorp Servs., Inc.
v. Western Union Tel. Co., No. 87-4463 (filed D. NJ.), complaint dated Nov. 9, 1987, answer and
amended counterclaim filed by Western Union, Jan. 15, 1988). Note that our search procedure was
not designed to identify cases involving either requirements contracts (e.g., Standard Oil v. United
States, 337 U.S. 292 (1948)) or tie-ins (e.g., International Salt v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947)).
In addition, we note that reported decisions represent a non-random sample of cases, see Priest &
Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984), and so may not be
representative of all complaints. In a similar vein, the rules against anticompetitive exclusion may
suppress obvious instances of the strategic uses of contract provisions.
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agreements adopted. This analysis begins with a discussion in some detail of
the case that in our judgment conformed most closely to the assumptions of
the strategic model, Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp.4 2 We then examine
the two cases offered by Aghion and Bolton as illustrations of their
arguments, United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.4 3 and Automatic Radio
Manufacturing Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,4 4 and discuss relevant aspects of
some related cases.
A.

Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp.

Consistent with the strategic model, this dispute involved just three
parties: Pacific Scientific Corp. ("Pacific"), which was an incumbent supplier
of "mechanical snubbers" for nuclear power plants; ITT Grinnell Corp.
("Grinnell"), which made and installed nuclear plant pipe systems and was
Pacific's major customer; and Barry Wright Corp. ("Barry"), which sought to
enter the business of producing mechanical snubbers. 4 5 Until 1975 most
snubbers, which act as shock absorbers for pipe systems, were hydraulic. At
that time, architects and engineers for nuclear plant manufacturers began to
specify mechanical snubbers, due to leakage problems with hydraulic units. 4 6

Only Pacific's mechanical snubber received Nuclear Regulatory Commission
approval, making Pacific an effective monopolist in the late 1970's. 4 7

At about the time that Barry entered the picture, Pacific offered Grinnell
price discounts if Grinnell would agree to long-term contracts containing
implicit cancellation penalties. Specifically, in the fall of 1976, Pacific offered
Grinnell additional 5 percent and 10 percent discounts 48 on its product if
Grinnell would sign contracts specifying large dollar orders. Grinnell was not
prevented from purchasing additional units from other suppliers, but the
record shows that the dollar amounts approached Grinnell's expected needs.
In addition, the contract contained a clause, which was at the center of Barry's
claims, requiring Grinnell to purchase from Pacific 100 percent of the dollar
amounts stipulated in the contract.
In January of 1977, Grinnell and Pacific agreed to a one-year contract for
$4.3 million; in May of that year, they signed two additional one-year
agreements stipulating purchases of $6.9 million in 1978 and $5 million in
1979. The 1977 discount prices applied for the first two years, with an
inflation adjustment for the final year. Barry, the would-be entrant, brought
suit against Pacific and Grinnell, arguing that the price cuts offered by Pacific
42.

724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983); see supra note 39.

43.
44.
45.

110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
339 U.S. 827 (1950).
Barry Wright Corp. v. Pacific Scientific Corp., 555 F. Supp. 1264, 1265-66 (D. Mass. 1983).

A discussion of this case can also be found in Williamson, Pretrial Uses of Economists: On the Use of
"Incentive Logic" to Screen Predation, 29 ANTITRUST BULL. 475 (1984).

46. Barry Wright, 555 F. Supp. at 1265-66.
47. Id. Its share of mechanical snubber sales was 94% in 1979. Barry Wright, 724 F.2d 227, 229
(Ist Cir. 1983).
48. Pacific's standard rate was 20% off list price; it offered an extra 5 or 10% off list. Barry
Wright, 724 F.2d at 229.
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were predatory and that the cancellation clause was exclusionary. In
particular, Barry argued that the cancellation provisions compelled contract
performance and, except to the extent that Grinnell's needs exceeded the
dollar amounts specified in its contract with Pacific, effectively excluded Barry.
Although on the surface these facts fit the Aghion-Bolton scenario, the
record reveals important details that bear on the nature and purpose of the
contracts. First, the history of the relations among the parties and their
behavior provides a rich example of real-world bargaining. In particular,
Grinnell's actions prior to signing the contracts with Pacific show clearly that
Grinnell was not a passive buyer whose agreements with Pacific were intended
to exclude Barry as a second source. On the contrary, Grinnell was an active
participant in Barry's efforts to produce mechanical snubbers.
As noted earlier, Grinnell became a major customer of Pacific when the
market turned from hydraulic to mechanical snubbers. During this period,
Grinnell attempted to develop its own snubber production capability, 49 but,
having failed at these attempts, sought to have Barry, which had previously
produced a mechanical snubber prototype for aerospace applications,
manufacture snubbers for Grinnell's use. Indeed, the terms of the agreement
between Grinnell and Barry resembled a joint venture. 50 Grinnell agreed to
pay up to $294,000 of Barry's development costs and to buy snubbers
exclusively from Barry, committing itself to between $9 and 15 million worth
of purchases in the period between 1977 and 1979. 5 1 According to the
agreement, Barry would sell only to Grinnell for this period and left Grinnell
the option to buy Barry's production facilities within the three-year period.
Only when it became evident that Barry would not be able to meet its
contractual obligations did Grinnell open negotiations with Pacific to meet its
snubber needs. Furthermore, even though it was clear early on that Barry
could not qualify its products by January 1977, Grinnell rejected Pacific's
initial offer of price discounts tied to placing a $5.7 million order to cover its
1977 requirements. Instead, Grinnell placed a $1 million order at the usual,
undiscounted price. Barry continued to have production problems and in
January 1977 signaled to Grinnell its inability to deliver small units until
August 1977 and larger units until February 1978. Grinnell informed Barry
that Barry had breached their earlier agreement and subsequently entered
into the three contracts with Pacific that assured Grinnell of the discount
prices through 1979.52
Contrary to the strategic model, the facts in this case reveal that the buyer
(Grinnell) had substantial bargaining power in its dealings with both the
incumbent (Pacific) and the entrant (Barry). Indeed, the record indicates that
the negotiations took place in an ongoing fashion, with no party relying on
49. Grinnell had been a major producer of hydraulic snubbers. Barry Wright, 555 F. Supp. at
1264-66.
50. Reflecting the character of the Grinnell/Barry agreement, Grinnell internal correspondence
referred to it as such. Id. at 1270.
51. Id. at 1266.
52. Id. at 1268-69.
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non-discriminatory final offers.

Moreover, attempts to enter the industry

came either directly from Grinnell or with Grinnell's direct participation. In
paying Barry's development costs and stipulating per-unit prices ex ante,
Grinnell assured itself prices at or near Barry's marginal costs. Under such
circumstances, it is unlikely that Grinnell would have acquiesced to contracts
designed to extract the surplus from that arrangement, which accrued mainly
to itself.
Second, it appears that the contract generated cost savings for Pacific. The
production of snubbers involved lags of about six months between orders and
delivery. The court record establishes that Pacific realized substantial
economies from being able to rely on a high level of production: "The price
discount, by securing the firm order, allowed Pacific to operate [at] this
capacity more efficiently, saved Pacific money, and thereby produced more
profit than a higher price (without the firm order) could have done, without
regard to any impact on Barry." 5 3 Nor did the duration of the contracts seem
excessive in light of these lags and the small-numbers negotiating setting in
which they were written. 54 Grinnell's exhibited reluctance to enter the
contracts with Pacific was eroded only as it became increasingly evident that
Barry would not become a viable second source. In fact, Grinnell agreed to
large-volume, long-term agreements with Pacific only after it had become
unmistakably clear that Barry would be unable to produce an acceptable
substitute within any reasonable period.
An additional consideration was the nature and effect of the cancellation
clause in the contract between Grinnell and Pacific, which was a matter of
dispute among the litigants. While Barry claimed the clause required Grinnell
to pay for 100 percent of its obligations to Pacific upon cancellation of the
contract, the district court concluded:
[I]t is clear that blanket purchase orders of the type executed by Pacific and Grinnell in
January and July, 1977, were agreements governing price only. No firm obligations of
the seller to deliver and the buyer to pay for the good arose until specific purchase
orders were submitted. If the agreed upon minimums were not ordered, the agreed
upon discounts would be withdrawn, and the purchaser would
be obligated to pay at
55
standard rates for products actually ordered and delivered.

If this interpretation of the cancellation provisions of the contract is
correct, the effective penalty for reducing orders, and thus the contract's
potential for exclusion, is substantially lessened. For the incentive provisions
of the contract to exclude a more efficient rival, the effective contract price
53.

Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 236.

54. District Court Judge Skinner concluded:
It seems to me to be an extraordinary extension on [sic] antitrust theory to hold a
noncancellable clause in a one-year purchase contract illegal because [fulfillment is] not
economically inevitable. I have found no case so holding, and I rule that the imposition of
this clause, given the history of the relations between Grinnell and Pacific, and Pacific's
legitimate desire to plan its production for at least a year, is not illegal exclusionary conduct
Barry Wright, 555 F. Supp. at 1272.
55.

Id.
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would have to be below the marginal costs of the incumbent. Whereas a 100
percent minimum bill requirement would have satisfied that condition, the
volume-based quantity discounts left price substantially above marginal costs
over all but a 5 to 10 percent range of the contract minimum.

56

Although the cancellation provisions in this case were held to be nonexclusionary, the appellate court underscored the general point that even if
Pacific did try to use the cancellation clause to compel performance, the
provision would represent a penalty and would not be enforceable. 5 7 The
court acknowledged the concern that the provision's "presence does still
threaten the buyer with the lawsuit that would be needed to prove that it is
unenforceable. And it is this threat, and the consequent additional deterrence
to the 'breach and pay damages' course of action that constitutes the
'unreasonable anticompetitive' aspect of the clause." 5 8 But the court found
this argument to be inapplicable in this case: "Given Grinnell's size and the
competence of its legal staff, it is most unlikely to have been deterred by
Pacific's assertion of unusually high damages resting upon a legally invalid
provision in the contract." 5 9
When examined in detail, Bany v. Grinnell serves, in our opinion, to
demonstrate a number of the obstacles to using contracts strategically and the
hazards of entertaining claims of exclusion based on contract damages. A
buyer facing a sole supplier has considerable incentive to promote
development of alternative sources, through either outside suppliers or
integrated production and, as long as those prospects remain viable, would be
understandably reluctant to commit itself to dealing with an incumbent
supplier for an extended period. The analysis also reinforces the tenuous
legal status of the terms needed to support exclusion. Parties have an
incentive to challenge, and courts frequently invalidate, cancellation
provisions perceived to penalize the breacher. Finally, the case between Barry
and Grinnell effectively illustrates the potential for abuse of the antitrust laws
by opportunistic agents. 60 The prospect of treble damages was enough to
induce a clearly high-cost rival like Barry to file against its former partner.
56. The court found the discounted prices "generated revenues more than sufficient to cover
the total cost of producing the goods to which they applied," a finding that Barry did not dispute.
Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 231.
57. The appellate court stated:
Even if one heroically assumed that Grinnell might have wished to breach and to buy
elsewhere in 1977, 1978 or 1979, it is virtually impossible to believe that the presence of this
clause could have stopped it from doing so. Given Grinnell's size and the competence of its
legal staff, it is most unlikely to have been deterred by Pacific's assertion of unusually high
damages resting upon a legally invalid provision in the contract. (And, if the provision is
not legally invalid-that is, if it does reasonably reflect Pacific's likely actual damages-then
it is not, from an antitrust perspective, unreasonable.)
Id. at 239.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. For a discussion of the problems ensuing from the availability of the private antitrust remedy
to competitor plaintiffs, see E. SNYDER & T. KAUPER, MISUSE OF THE ANTITRUST LAws (University of
Michigan Working Paper, 1989).
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United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.

Cited by Aghion and Bolton as an illustration of their argument, 6 1 United
Shoe is the most famous antitrust case involving the use of contract provisions
to deter customers from switching suppliers. 6 2 United, the dominant
manufacturer of shoe machinery in the 1940's and 1950's,63 leased its
machines under long-term contracts that included three potentially suspect
provisions: (1) minimum monthly fees; 64 (2) a "full capacity clause" requiring
lessees to "use the leased machine to its full capacity upon all boots, shoes, or
other footwear or portions thereof ... of which such machine is capable of
being used;" 65 and (3) substantial fees for returning machines during the term
66
of the lease, which usually ran ten years.
Although the government succeeded in convincing the court that these
provisions combined to deter switching to United's competitors, three factors
raise doubts that United's leases would have excluded an efficient entrant and
lend support to an efficiency interpretation of the provisions. First, the
necessary condition that entrants stood to earn above-normal rates of return
was probably absent. In fact, United faced competition for decades from a
group of competitors properly characterized as a competitive fringe. 6 7 These
firms typically did not engage in research and development efforts, did not
68
innovate, and competed by offering similar machines.
61. Aghion & Bolton, supra note 4, at 388.
62. United States v.United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'dper curiam,
347 U.S. 521 (1954). We plan to analyze United Shoe's practices and the effects of the antitrust
litigation in more detail in future research. For a detailed review of United Shoe, see C. KAYSEN,
UNITED STATES V. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CORPORATION: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AN ANTI-TRUST

CASE (1956). Posner cited United Shoe to illustrate his claim that suppliers must compensate
customers for exclusionary contract provisions: "[C]ustomers of United would be unlikely to
participate in a campaign to strengthen United's monopoly position without insisting on being
compensated ...." R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 203 (1976). However,
for reasons articulated by Aghion and Bolton, the strategic argument must be evaluated on its merits.
63. United's dominance dates back to industry consolidation in 1899 and some 30 subsequent
acquisitions. United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 307, 312.
64. The effect of the minimum monthly fee was to lower the implied marginal cost of using a
machine at operating levels below 25 percent of capacity. Id. at 319-20.
65. Id.at 316.
66. Id.at 316-17. United leased most of its machines, a practice that may reflect its customers'
preferences, as leasing made it "easy for a person with modest capital and of something less than
superior efficiency to become a shoe manufacturer." Id. at 323. But, as is well understood, by
leasing, a manufacturer retains control over the secondary market and as a result may be better able
to exploit its demand. In support of this view, the record cites that United purchased used machines
only to dispose of them. Id. at 333-34 (from 1931 to 1942, United spent approximately $350,000 for
used machinery that apparently was not resold or leased).
67. Carl Kaysen states:
Existing rivals in the machinery market do not appear to constitute a significant limitation
on United's power. The sample of shoe factories revealed 22 known competitors, the
largest of which was Compo, with 3.4 per cent of the total number of major machines in the
sample inventory and the second largest, International Shoe Machinery Corp., with 0.6 per
cent of the total number of machines.
C. KAYSEN, supra note 62, at 52. United Shoe's dominant market position was due to a combination
of numerous acquisitions and mergers and internal growth, as discussed briefly by the district court,
United Shoe, 222 F. at 349, and in more detail in C. KAYSEN, supra note 62.
68. The district court stated that while United Shoe had over 2000 patents for shoe machinery
equipment, most of its important patents had expired. United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 332-33. The
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Second, the substantial return fees charged by United are consistent with
non-strategic motives. Without any return fees, a customer would wish to
return the machine whenever the lessee's valuation fell below the stream of
payments required to keep the machine. United, however, would want to
discourage returns unless a customer's valuation fell below United's
opportunity cost. Given United's market power, the alternative value of a
returned machine would have been United's marginal revenue-which would
have been equated (in expected terms) to its marginal cost-rather than the
rental price. 6 9 Thus, even absent strategic intentions, United would have set a
return fee equal to the premium in excess of its marginal costs.
Lastly, when a manufacturer provides information or services that are not
specific to the manufacturer's product, a buyer may be able to avoid payment
for the services by switching to a competitor's product, jeopardizing the
provision of the services. The existence of free-riding of this sort has been
used elsewhere to justify exclusive-dealing arrangements. 70 In the present
case, United offered an extensive network of information and services to its
customers in conjunction with its machines, much of which was of a type that
could be valuably employed in conjunction with non-United equipment. 7 1
Moreover, given that most of United's important patents had expired, 72
United was particularly vulnerable to offerings of similar machines by its
competitors who did not provide similar levels of support and service. In
light of this situation, switching fees may have represented a less extreme
alternative to exclusive dealing as a response to the problem of free-riding on
manufacturer services.

median age of United Shoe's models was 28 years in 1953, and its more important models tended to
be even older. Id. at 331. Given the absence of patent protection, competitor machines were
available for all key steps in the manufacturing process. Id. at 339. Although strategic lease
provisions could account for the failure of firms within this fringe to attract substantial numbers of
customers from United Shoe, the ability of United Shoe to deny an outlet for its competitors'
machines is disputed by the existence of some 1400 shoe manufacturers in the industry at that time.
Id. at 301, 328. The ability of competitors to find potential outlets for their machines was further
enhanced by a turnover rate of 10-12% per year in the shoe manufacturing industry. C. KAYSEN,
supra note 62, at 55.
69. Cf Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. Goren Equip. Co., Inc., 576 F. Supp. 1348 (N.D. Ga. 1979). In
this case concerning the sale of used diesel engines, the court found that a stipulated damage clause
requiring the buyer to pay the full contract price in the event of breach was unenforceable since "had
plaintiff repossessed the unpaid engines, it would have had the option of reselling those engines in
an attempt to 'cover,' and it would be able to recover the difference between the resale price and the
contract price." Id. at 1357. The issue of Ryder's market power was not addressed. Given that shoe
machines, like diesel engines, are not specialized assets and therefore have a high alternative value,
the same reasoning could be applied to United's return fees. Note, however, that placing of a used
machine could require some discounting due to a "lemon's effect."
70. See, e.g., Marvel, supra note 12.
71. The service included expert advice on how to improve the quality of shoe production, help
in various technical shoemaking and shoe factory problems, and technical assistance to "shoe
manufacturers desiring engineering surveys on production methods, on costs, on factory layouts,
and other matters." United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 321.
72. Id. at 333. For a discussion of United's patents, see C. KAYSEN, supra note 62, at 78-90.
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Automatic Radio Manufacturing Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.

In addition to United Shoe, Aghion and Bolton cite one other case, Automatic
Radio Manufacturing Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. In this case, defendant
Hazeltine, a developer of radio broadcasting technology, allowed its licensees
to use any or all of Hazeltine's current and future patents in return for
royalties equal to a small percentage of the licensee's gross sales. At the time
of the litigation, the license covered 570 patents and 200 applications used in
73
the manufacture of radio broadcasting apparatus.
Aghion and Bolton argue that licensees such as Automatic Radio "had to
pay a fixed fee irrespective of whether it exploited the patents licensed" and
that "[a]ny new licensor therefore faced an entry barrier equal to the amount
of this fee."' 74 More precisely, a bias against using competitors' patents would
arise because of differences in the marginal cost of adopting the alternative
technologies. Since the fees paid to Hazeltine were a function only of the
manufacturer's sales, the marginal cost of using an additional Hazeltine
patent to a manufacturer who already used a Hazeltine technology was nearly
zero; whereas to adopt an alternative technology, a manufacturer incurred a
cost equal to the amount charged by the alternative licensor.
However, each court that reviewed the case expressed the view that
charging fees equal to a percentage of licensee sales reflected sound business
judgment. 75 Requiring Hazeltine to charge for each use of its hundreds of
patents would have decreased the value of Hazeltine's patents (1) by
substantially increasing monitoring costs, and (2) by discouraging use of the
patents at the margin by increasing the cost of output embodying the
patented technologies relative to that of other output. 76 Since the actual cost
of extending the use of a patented technology to an additional application is
negligible, the efficient use of that technology dictates a zero incremental cost
to the user. Thus the license terms appear to have given licensees the correct
incentives to utilize Hazeltine's patents fully while minimizing the costs of
77
collecting royalties.
D.

Other Cases

Two additional cases serve further to illustrate the difficulty of imputing
strategic motives to contractual agreements. The first regards a recently
73. 339 U.S. 827, 829 (1950).
74. Aghion & Bolton, supra note 4, at 398.
75. Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co., 77 F. Supp. 493, 496-97 (D.Mass.
1948); 176 F.2d 799, 804 (1st Cir. 1949); 339 U.S. 827, 834 (1950).
76. 339 U.S. at 833; 176 F.2d 799, 804 (1st Cir. i949); 77 F. Supp. 493, 496 (D. Mass. 1948).
The cost of monitoring usage of patented or copyrighted material was also the basis for justifying
ASCAP's and BMI's use of blanket licenses for rights of all musical compositions in their repertories
in exchange for flat annual fees. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting, 441 U.S. 1

(1979).
77. In addition, licensees were not otherwise compelled to adopt the inventions covered by the
patents or restricted from producing goods using other patents. Id.
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settled dispute between Citicorp and Western Union, 78 and the second relates
to the role of license fees in litigation over IBM's leases for plug-compatible
79
peripheral components.
The dispute between Citicorp Services, Inc., and Western Union
Telegraph Co. offers another example of the use of "exclusionary" contracts
to protect against free riding by an entrant on manufacturer-provided
services. Attempting to establish itself in the "public money transfer"
business, Citicorp had enlisted Western Union agents to act also as Citicorp
agents, offering commission rates above Western Union's as an inducement.
In response, Western Union: (1) imposed exclusive dealing contracts on
some of its 10,500 outlets; (2) terminated some outlets that agreed to act as
Citicorp agents; and (3) denied other dual agents the right to handle other
Western Union services.
Although Citicorp alleged that these actions prevented it from entering
the money transfer market, the actions can be interpreted as consistent with
the manufacturer-services rationale for exclusive dealing and switching
penalties. In establishing an effective network, Western Union needed to
identify suitable agents and locations over an extensive geographic region, as
well as advertise the existence and qualities of its service. Quite clearly,
Western Union was vulnerable to free riding on its efforts to attract customers
and agents, if the latter were also allowed to offer Citicorp services. By
relying on Western Union's advertising and locations, Citicorp could lure
away both customers and agents with more favorable terms without incurring
comparable costs.
The IBM litigation focused on IBM's announcement in May of 1971 of its
fixed-term leasing plan for plug-compatible peripherals. Several rivals
objected to IBM's reductions in rental rates and to their new one- and twoyear leases. The leases offered discounts of up to 10 percent on monthly rates
and imposed return fees that in the two-year leases, for instance, equaled five
times the monthly rental if the lease was terminated in the first twelve months,
and two and one-half times that amount in the second year.80
Again, the facts of the case make it difficult to impute a strategic motive to
IBM. First, the leases were introduced after several competitors had already
established themselves in the peripheral market and in response to
significantly lower prices by the entrants. 8 ' IBM's lease terms themselves
were similar to the terms offered by competitors and, according to the courts
82
involved in this litigation, were commonplace commercial agreements.
78. Citicorp Servs., Inc. v. Western Union Tel. Co., No. 87-4463 (filed D. NJ.), complaint dated
Nov. 9, 1987, answer and amended counterclaim filed by Western Union, Jan. 15, 1988.
79. Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258 (1973), aff'd in part, revd in part, 510 F.2d 894
(1975); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (1978), 636 F.2d 1188 (1980);
California Computer Prod. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (1979).
80. Telex, 510 F.2d at 902-03.
81. Id. at 903-04.
82. Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 300-01, 346 (Court Finding F100 and Court
Conclusion C29). These findings are cited and discussed at length by the appellate court in Telex,
510 F.2d at 906, 920-21.
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Moreover, by using longer leases, IBM, like its competitors, avoided costly
"churning" of machines and succeeded in reducing its costs.8

3

Perhaps more important, the IBM case illustrates the potential for misuse
of the private antitrust remedy that could arise if theories of exclusion based
on the use of contract provision were generally accepted. Such theories
would allow competitor plaintiffs who were "excluded" merely because of
competition to bring Sherman Act section 2 claims. Even if the courts
eventually reject meritless claims of exclusion, the costs of applying rule-ofreason analyses to the questions of strategic use of contracts could restrict
incumbents' responses to entry and, perversely, could sustain entry by less
efficient suppliers. Thus, establishing antitrust liability based on the strategic
model would involve a tradeoff between exclusion of more efficient entrants
and restrictions on more efficient incumbents.
V
CONCLUSION

The conditions under which contracts can be used strategically are fairly
restrictive. First, a new supplier must expect to earn excess rents upon
winning the customer's business. Where the market for substitute
performance is populated with homogeneous firms, competition among them
to serve the buyer keeps price near marginal costs, eliminating the strategic
motive of the original contracting parties. For there to be expected rents
from entry, some firms must be substantially better situated to enter than
others. Even then, the possibility of integrating the low-cost supplier reduces
the threat of strategic deterrence. Finally, there is both theoretical support
and casual evidence for the contrary conclusion that buyers, if anything, are
likely to maintain even inefficient producers as second sources to gain
84
leverage in bargaining with incumbents.
When the economic conditions for the strategic use of contracts are
present, the law presents a number of obstacles to deterring entry through
contracts. First, the common law treatment of excessive damages undermines
directly the ability of parties to use contracts strategically. In addition, rules
regarding delegation of performance and mutual modification mitigate, if not
eliminate, the commitment required to prevent the parties from striking deals,
either unilaterally or in concert, with a more efficient supplier. In these
respects, at least, the law of contract supports efficient outcomes. Indeed, the
results of the Aghion-Bolton model provide an additional reason not
previously identified in the literature for why court invalidation of contract
penalties is a sensible legal precept. 85
83. Telex, 367 F. Supp. at 297, 300-01 (Court Findings F89a and FI00); 510 F.2d at 920-21.
84. See, e.g., Demski, Sappington & Spiller, Managing Supplier Switching, 18 RAND J. ECON. 77
(1987).
85. Aghion & Bolton, supra note 4, at 389-92.
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Our review of antitrust cases relating to the issue of contract exclusion
further supports a cautious approach to exclusionary claims.

Despite a

presumptive bias toward a finding of strategic effect, the small set of cases that
deal with exclusion through use of stipulated damages or their equivalent fails
to substantiate the purported dangers of exclusionary contracts. Often,
behavior or conditions necessary for successful exclusion are absent. The
record of dealings in Barry Wright, for instance, illustrates the process of
complicated negotiations and rivalry that often characterizes small-number
supplier-customer relations-and contradicts the take-it-or-leave-it contract
commitment essential to the theory. In every case, moreover, the contract
provisions in question have sound efficiency rationales.
What stance should the antitrust laws take toward stipulated damage and
related contractual provisions in light of these findings? A central question is
whether the courts can devise market tests or screens to identify when

contract provisions are likely to be used strategically and when they enhance
efficiency by properly aligning incentives.8 6 Even if such tests can be
developed, whether courts should subject such provisions to a rule-of-reason
analysis as a general policy depends on the costs of applying the rule, both in
terms of enforcement and in terms of the impairment of efficiency.

The

inclination of firms to use the antitrust treble damage remedy to impose costs
on rivals suggests that a substantial threshold should be established before
provisions, widely recognized to enhance efficiency in many circumstances,
are exposed to critical legal review because of conceivable strategic uses.

86.

Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1984).
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APPENDIX

In this appendix, we derive the optimal stipulated damage provision
between a risk-neutral buyer and seller. The privately optimal choice of
contract terms is that which maximizes the expected joint profits of the
transactors, subject to the buyer's ex post decision of whether to perform the
contract. Using the notation in the text, the buyer breaches whenever v - Pe
- 8 > v - p. The seller, in turn, receives p-c if the contract is performed
and 8 if the buyer breaches. Since the buyer will switch only if Pe <_p - 8,
and it will be in the entrant's interest to enter only ifpe >s(O), the probability
of breach is Pr[s(0) < p - 8].
Suppose that the price received by the entrant is ultimately a matter of
negotiation and falls somewhere between p-8 and s(O). Then letting a
characterize the outcome of those negotiations, the entrant's price can be
written aspe = a(p -8) + (1-c)s(0), where a E [0,1] and may be thought of
as a parameter reflecting the bargaining strength of the entrant relative to the
buyer. If c = 1, the entrant has all the bargaining power andpe = p-8; if Ct
= 0, the buyer has all of the bargaining power and Pe =s(O). Letting P
represent the probability of breach, the incumbent seller's expected profits
would be
S =

(l-P)

(p-c) + P8
p-8

and the buyer's
B

=

(1

-

P) (v

-

p) + f (V-pe-8) P'ds(0)
0

Maximizing the sum of these two expressions with respect to 8 yields the
following first-order condition:

a(TrB+IS)

= P'(8 - p + c) -

Rewriting this expression yields 8 = p - c +

aP = 0.
p,

In other words, when a = 1 and the entrant is able to extract all the rents
from entry (the Aghion-Bolton assumption), the optimal stipulated damage
between the parties exceeds the lost-profit level. When c = 0 and the entrant
is unable to charge a price above opportunity cost (as in the efficient breach
model), the optimal penalty reduces to 8 - p-c, the ex post efficient level.

